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Case No. 860225 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
GAYLA HATCH ANDERSON 
Plainti ff/Respondent, 
v. 
MICHAEL HALL HATCH, 
De fendant/Appe11 ant. 
ooOoo 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ooOoo 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a post-judgment proceeding in a divorce case 
involving the interpretation of a provision in the Decree related 
to use and possession of the marital residence and determination 
and payment of sums representing equity in that residence. Both 
parties sought an interpretation of that provision from the trial 
court. Both the Domestic Commissioner and the Trial Court agreed 
with Respondents position that she was entitled to retain 
possession of the residence for herself and the minor child, 
subject to her paying Appellant one-half of the equity in the 
residence as of the date of the Decree. The Trial Court rejected 
Appellant's contention that upon the remarriage of Respondent, or 
an attempt by her to sell the residence, he would be allowed to 
purchase her share in the home for one-half of the equity in the 
home as of the date of either of the two events described above. 
It is from that ruling that Appellant brings this appeal claiming 
that Paragraph 5 of the Decree supports his position; that the 
doctrine of res; judicata prevents Respondent from prevailing; and 
that an evidentiary hearing should have been held. Respondent 
claims that each of these arguments are simply without merit, and 
requests that the decision of the Trial Court affirming the 
decisions of the Domestic Relations Commissioner likewise be 
affirmed by this Court. 
STATEMENT_OF__FACTS 
Because Appellant's Statement of Facts fails to mention 
certain facts which are materially important to the determination 
of this appeal, and has either over or under emphasized other 
facts, Respondent wishes to provide her own statement of Facts 
set forth below: 
l^£-£IZ£H-ll£B£^l and events surrounding 
tk£ PZ£P££^ii£B_-2l_i^£_slSn£^ 
^ilEHl^il£B-£Il^-.lll£-.?££^££-_£l_?iX££££ • 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Gayla Hatch Anderson (Mrs. Hatch), 
filed a Complaint for divorce against the Defendant/Appellant, 
Michael Hall Hatch (Mr. Hatch), on July 17, 1975 (R.2-5). 
Subsequently, the parties reached a Stipulation which dealt with, 
among other things, the distribution of real and personal 
property of the parties. Mrs. Hatch's attorney drafted a 
Stipulation which reflected the parties agreement (R.58). It is 
included as Exhibit "A" in the Addendum to this Brief. Paragraph 
2b states that: 
2 
Plaintiff may be awarded the use of the home and real 
property located at 13227 South 2860 West, Riverton, 
Utah, subject to the payment of the mortgage thereon, 
unti 1 !he_occurrence_of[_one_ 
£^2ilB££B£l££* to w*t: the remarriage of the Plaintiff, 
the youngest child reaches majority, or Plaintiff 
desires to sell said home , £l_whj[ch_ t^me_PJ. zint^ i_ j: _f 
pursuant to an appraisal to be made forthwith and 
determine the equity as of this date. Said appraisal 
to be paid for by the Defendant, and the Defendant 
shall have the option to purchase Plaintiff's equity on 
the occurrence of any of the above contingencies in the 
event Plaintiff does not purchase Defendant's equity, 
said equity to be based on an appraisal and 
determination as of the date of the occurrence of the 
one of the above contingencies. In the event neither 
party exercises the option to purchase said home, it 
will be sold and Defendant would receive the equity 
pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and the present 
appraisal. (Emphasis added) (R.66-67). 
This particular paragraph reflected Mrs. Hatch's intent that 
she would have the first option to purchase Mr. Hatch's equity in 
the parties' marital residence in the event one of the 
contingencies occurred (R.58). Mrs. Hatch expressed to her 
counsel that she would not be willing to settle and agree to any 
other type of arrangement in regard to the parties' marital 
residence (R.58). 
Defendant's counsel, Leland K. Wimmer, then retyped the 
Stipulation submitted by Mrs. Hatch's attorney (R.15-16; R.58, 
paragraphs 5 and 6; R.72, Affidavit of Leland Wimmer, paragraph 
5), a copy of which is included as Exhibit "B" in the Addendum to 
this brief. Paragraph 2b of Mr. Hatch's retyped Stipulation is 
identical to Paragraph 2b of Mrs. Hatch's retyped Stipulation 
with the exception of the provision regarding the occurrence of 
3 
the contingencies triggering an equity payout and provided as 
follows: 
£Pii2^i£_PH££ll£££--.£i£illiill^-_£SHiiy pursuant to the 
appraisal to be made forthwith to deTermine the equity 
as of this date, said appraisal to be paid for by 
Defendant, and Plaintiff shall have the option to 
purchase Defendants equity on the occurrence of any of 
the above contingencies in the event Defendant does not 
purchase Plaintiff's equity, said equity being based 
upon an appraisal and determination as of the date of 
the occurrence of one of the above contingencies, 
(emphasis added) (It.15-16). 
Mr. Wimmer's version of the Stipulation had several other 
substantial differences from that Stipulation submitted by Mr. 
Olsen. For example, paragraph f of Mrs. Hatch's Stipulation 
provides for child support in the amount of $150.00 per child, 
per month for a total of $300.00. Mr. WimmerTs retyped 
Stipulation revised this figure to $100.00 per child, per month. 
Paragraph h of the original Stipulation provides that Mr. Hatch 
is to maintain medical insurance and life insurance with the 
minor children as beneficiaries and Mr. Wimmer, in the retyped 
version, carries this provision forward with the additional 
condition that both the health and life insurance be maintained 
only so long as Mr. Hatch is employed through Operation 
Engineers. Also, Mrs. Hatch requested $350.00 additional 
attorney's fee in paragraph i, whereas in paragraph j of Mr. 
Wimmer's version, each party is to assume their own attorney's 
fees and costs. Finally, there is a provision in paragraph i of 
Mr. Hatch's Stipulation that, "Plaintiff agrees to continue 
existing marriage counseling", a provision that is not contained 
4 
in the original Stipulation submitted by Mr. Olsen. 
This Stipulation, with the transposition of the words 
"Plaintiff" and "Defendant" in Paragraph 2b was submitted to Mrs. 
Hatch's counsel, signed and filed with the Court. (R.15-17, 58). 
Mrs. Hatch was granted a Decree of Divorce on November 21, 
1975, after a default hearing before the Honorable Stewart 
Hansen, Jr. (R.20-22). The Decree simply restated the terms of 
the Stipulation which had been retyped and submitted by Mr. 
Hatch's counsel, (R.15-17; R.20-22; R.73, paragraph 7). 
Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce, which was signed by 
the Court, states as follows: 
Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded the use 
of the home and real property located at 13227 South 
2860 West, Riverton, Utah, subject to the payment of 
the mortgage thereon, until the occurrence of one of 
the following contingencies, to wit: The remarriage of 
plaintiff, the youngest child reaches majority, or 
plaintiff desires to sell said home, at which time 
defendant shall have first option to purchase 
plaintiff's equity pursuant to an appraisal to be made 
forthwith to determine the equity as of this date, said 
appraisal to be paid for by defendant, and plaintiff 
shall have the option to purchase Defendants equity on 
the occurrence of any of the above contingencies in the 
event defendant does not purchase plaintiff's equity, 
said equity to be based on an appraisal and 
determination as of the date of the occurrence of one 
of the above contingencies. In the event neither party 
exercised the option to purchase, the home shall be 
sold and Defendant shall receive the equity pursuant to 
the Decree of Divorce and the present appraisal." 
(R.21) 
Mrs. Hatch stated in her Verified Motion to Clarify Decree 
(R.57) that it was her understanding that Paragraph 5 of the 
Decree, which dealt with the parties marital residence, contained 
a standard clause that she would be granted use and possession 
5 
and assume the mortgage and continue to live in the marital 
residence and had the first option to buy out Mr. Hatch in the 
event one of the listed contingencies were triggered (R.57-64, 
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 25) in accord with the 
negotiations that had earlier occurred. In addition, she stated 
that she never would have agreed to a Stipulation that would not 
have given her the first option to purchase Mr. Hatch1s equity 
determined as of the date of the Decree if and when one of 
the contingencies occurred. 
Fa c ! sL_M^_.£i r £H51li^-££^_£H££2HI}^I2£-i^£ 
triggering o? the listed contingencies. 
On February 2, 1981, and again on August 10, 1981, Mrs. 
Hatch listed the parties* marital residence for sale (R.60, 
paragraph 4). A copy of these listings is included as 
Exhibit "C" in the Addendum to this Brief. She advised Mr. Hatch 
of these listings (R.60, paragraph 12). However, Mr. Hatch never 
made any attempt to exercise the option he claims existed in his 
favor (R.60, paragraph 13). 
On March 26, 1984, Mrs. Hatch married Terry Anderson and 
again promptly notified Mr. Hatch of her second marriage (R.60, 
paragraph 14). At no time following the notification of Mrs. 
Hatch's marriage did Mr. Hatch attempt to serve any notice that 
he wished to exercise his claimed option to purchase Plaintiff's 
equity in the home (R.60; paragraphs 16-17). 
On April 17, 1984, Mrs. Hatch made arrangements for a loan 
to pay Mr. Hatch's equity and assume full title to the house and 
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advised him of such (R.61, paragraph 19), He refused her offer 
of payment and would not sign a Quit Claim Deed on the property 
(R.61, paragraph 19). On several occasions subsequent to her 
first tender on April 17, 1984, Mrs. Hatch has requested Mr. 
Hatch to accept her offer to purchase his interest in the home. 
(R.61, paragraphs 20, 21, and 22). Mr. Hatch refused these 
subsequent tenders and again refused to execute a Quit Claim Deed 
(R.61, paragraphs 20, 21 and 22). At no time has Mr. Hatch 
offered to purchase Mrs. Hatch's equity in the residence as he 
claims he is entitled to do (R.61, paragraphs 20 and 21). 
Facts and circumstances surrounding 
_t he__p o£t^2iH^®B^Hl_P£££££^i5£l • 
Because of Mr. Hatch's refusals to accept payment on his 
equity from Mrs. Hatch, Mrs. Hatch filed an Order to Show Cause 
to compel Mr. Hatch to accept her tender on April 9, 1985. It 
was scheduled for May 7, 1985 (R.42-43). In response, Mr. Hatch 
filed a Motion for Clarification of Decree of Divorce (R.45). 
The Court's file on this matter is confusing in that there is no 
notice of a May 7, 1985 hearing. Apparently there was a 
scheduled hearing on the Motion for Clarification of Decree set 
for May 9, 1985, but that specific hearing was stricken and both 
parties were not in attendance (R.46). 
At the May 7, 1985, hearing on Defendant's Motion, the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner took the matter under advisement 
(R.49). 
Mrs. Hatch's former counsel withdrew on July 19, 1985, 
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(R.50) at which time she retained her present counsel, Frank 
Pignanel1i, 
Mr. Pignanelli contacted Commissioner Peuler in the early 
summer of 1985 and requested that some disposition needed to be 
made of Mrs. Hatch's Order to Show Cause and Mr. Hatch's Motion 
for Clarification. A letter advising Mr. Hatch's counsel of 
these discussions was sent to him in August of 1985. (See Exhibit 
"D" included in the addendum to this Brief). On August 23, 1985, 
Commissioner Peuler recommended that the Order to Show Cause 
should be denied as no evidence was presented to show that 
Defendant failed to exercise his option (R.51). In her 
recommendation, Commissioner Peuler makes no mention of 
Defendant's Motion for Clarification. Either the Commissioner 
generally dismissed all matters before her, or the motion still 
remains unresolved. Commissioner Peuler also stated that 
counsel should advise if a special setting on the matter was 
necessary (R.51). 
Mr. Pignanelli filed a Notice of Appearance of Counsel for 
Mrs. Hatch on September 16, 1985, (R.54) and then filed a 
Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute a Quit Claim Deed 
and Request for Clarification of the Decree (R.57). Attached to 
the Verified Motion was a copy of the Original Stipulation 
submitted by Mrs. Hatch's first counsel (R.66-67), and copies of 
documents which reflected Mrs. Hatch's attempt to sell the home 
in 1981 (R.68-69). The Motion was heard on September 30, 1985, 
and Commissioner Peuler made the following recommendation: 
8 
That the intent of the decree, as evidenced by the 
stipulation, was that the defendant was to receive the 
1/2 share of his equity based upon the amount of the 
equity existing at the time of the decree. He was 
to receive that amount either at such time as Plaintiff 
exercised an option to purchase his equity, or upon the 
occurrence of one of the contingencies listed. If the 
defendant purchased Plaintifffs share of equity, her 
equity was to be determined as of the date of the 
cont ingency. 
That the prior recommendation is affirmed. (R.76) 
On October 3, 1985, Mr. Hatch filed an objection to 
Commissioner PeulerTs recommendation (R.80) and a hearing was 
scheduled before the Honorable David B. Dee on November 6, 1985 
(R.84). On October 9, 1985, counsel for Defendant, apparently 
presented an Order upon hearing the PlaintiffTs Order to Show 
Cause which reflected Commissioner PeulerTs first recommendation 
in this matter denying Mrs. Hatch's Order to Show Cause (R.80). 
(A copy of this Order is included in the Addendum to this Brief 
and marked Exhibit "E"). Even though Plaintiff's new counsel had 
both submitted a Notice of Appearance of Counsel, and had in fact 
appeared in Court representing Mrs. Hatch in this matter, no copy 
of this Order was sent to Mr. Pignanelli (R.80). The mailing 
certificate states only that a copy of this Order was sent to 
Mrs. Hatch, but not Mr. Pignanelli. 
At the November 6, 1985 hearing, counsel for both parties 
presented argument to the court and submitted documents and 
Affidavits in support of their respective positions. At no time 
during the course of the argument before Judge Dee was a court 
reporter requested by Mr. Hatch's counsel and the proceeding was 
9 
not reported. Judge Dee took the matter under advisement and 
later advised counsel that he would affirm Commissioner Peuler's 
recommendation in favor of Mrs. Hatch. 
Mrs. Hatch1s counsel then submitted proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order. Mr. Hatch1s counsel 
then objected to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and those objections were heard on March 19, 1986 (R.90-92). 
Judge Dee ruled that a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
were not necessary in connection with the respective Motions and 
that he would sign Mr. Pignanellifs proposed Order which 
reflected his affirmation of Commissioner Peuler's recommendation 
(R.93-95). A copy of that Order is included as Exhibit "F" in 
the Addendum to this Brief. It is from this Order which 
Defendant, Mr. Hatch appeals (R.96). 
No transcript of any of the above hearings was made nor has 
Appellant presented a statement of evidence or proceedings as 
provided in Rule 11(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
SUM^^Y_OF_^GUMENTS 
POINT I 
Other than the Trial Courts file, there is no record or 
transcript of the proceedings below. At no time during these 
proceedings did Appellant request a transcript. Absent a 
transcript, this Court in equity cases will not make its own 
factual determination and will presume that the Trial Court's 
decision is correct. 
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POINT_II_ 
The Decree of Divorce signed and entered in this matter 
states that Mrs. Hatch was awarded the use of the parties' 
marital residence and that she was responsible from that point 
forward for all mortgage payments on the residence. Since the 
date of the Decree, Mrs. Hatch has faithfully paid those mortgage 
payments, in addition to making substantial improvements on the 
home. Mr. Hatch suggests that he is entitled to one-half of the 
equity existing upon the occurrence of one of the listed 
contingencies regardless of the date of that occurrence. 
Such a result is contrary to the intent of the parties that 
Mr. Hatch receive one-half of the equity existing at the time of 
the Decree of Divorce. The Trial Court has both the discretion 
and the responsibility to make fair and equitable interpretations 
of its Decrees in divorce matters. Such was the result in this 
case. 
P02NT_rn 
Appellant, argues that the doctrine of res lH^i£^l£ bars 
Mrs. Hatch from receiving the relief granted by the Trial Court. 
Mr. Hatch asserts that the Order on Order to Show Cause signed by 
Judge Dee on October 9, 1985, effectively resolves the issues 
contained in Mrs. Hatch1 Verified Motion which was heard 
September 30, 1985. 
Rule 2.9(b) of the Rules of Practice in the District and 
Circuit Courts of Utah requires that the party submitting an 
Order to a Judge for signature is required to submit a copy of 
11 
that Order to the opposing counsel before it is signed by the 
Court. Counsel for Mr. Hatch clearly did not do this and as a 
result, is in violation of Rule 2.9(b). In the absence of a 
final judgment, the doctrine of res> iudi_cat^ a cannot be invoked. 
Also, Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide 
that any party responding to a pleading of another party must 
affirmatively set forth the defense of res judicata. Mr. Hatch 
failed to do this and thus is barred from now asserting the 
defense on appeal. 
PO^NT^^V 
Mr. Hatch claims that Mrs. Hatch did not satisfy the 
evidentiary burdens related to a Petition for Modification of 
Decree of Divorce. Mrs. Hatch never filed a Petition for 
Modification of Decree of Divorce; rather the Order on appeal is 
the Order on Mrs. Hatch's Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to 
Execute Quit Claim Deed and for Clarification of the Decree of 
Divorce. Therefore, any of the burdens of proof, case law and 
statutory requirements of the party seeking relief by a Petition 
for Modification of Decree of Divorce are not applicable to Mrs. 
Hatch. 
POJ:NT_V 
Because Appellant's claims are without merit and Respondent 
has been required to defend this appeal, she should be awarded 




APPELLANTS FAILURE TO PROVIDE A TRANSCRIPT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW PRECLUDES ADDITIONAL 
FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS OR ASSUMPTIONS AND THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION MUST BE AFFIRMED 
Mr. Hatch1s Objection to the Domestic Commissioner's 
recommendation came before Judge Dee on November 6, 1985. The 
Court requested the parties to state their respective positions 
and each submitted copies of motions filed (R.57), affidavits 
(R.20, R.66, 68, 69), and supporting documents. No objection to 
the procedure was made by Appellant nor did he request that the 
proceedings be reported. 
This Court has consistently held that a transcript of the 
proceedings below is prerequisite for a determination of the 
factual matters before it. In MjUchej_J._v^JMiJ:che^j_, 527 P.2d 
1359 (Utah, 1974), the Defendant appealed from an Order of the 
Trial Court which modified a previous Decree of Divorce. 
In refusing to alter the Trial Court's ruling, this Court 
stated: 
. . .in a divorce action, the Trial Court has a 
considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting 
financial and property interests, and its actions are 
indulged with a presumption of validity. The burden is 
upon appellant to prove that the evidence is clearly 
preponderate against the findings as made; or there was 
a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; or a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion. Id. at 1360. 
After establishing the Appellant's burden and obligations in 
an appeal of a modification, the Court went on to say: 
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In the instant action, Defendant had not included in 
the record on appeal a transcript of the hearing for 
the Petition for Modification. Defendant's points on 
appeal involve a factual determination which this Court 
obviously cannot undertake without a transcript of the 
hearing. The determination of the Trial Court that 
there had been a substantial change of circumstances 
which justified the increase of support and 
maintenance, is presumed valid. Id. at 1360-1361. 
The Court, in Sawyers^v^^Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607 (Utah, 1976), 
directly reaffirmed the holding in MjJ^chen_. In Sawyers;, the 
Defendant also appealed from a Trial Court's decision to modify 
the previous Decree of Divorce, and no copy of the transcript of 
the hearing was included in the record on appeal, nor was an 
abstract of the testimony presented for the Supreme Court's 
consideration. All the Court had before it was the brief each 
party submitted in support of their respective arguments. 
The Court stated that: 
Defendant's contentions and points on this appeal 
involve factual matters which this Court cannot resolve 
or undertake to determine without a transcript of the 
testimony. Id. at 608. 
The Court then held: 
Appellate review of factual matters can be meaningful, 
orderly, and intelligent only in juxtaposition to a 
record by which lower court's rulings and decisions on 
disputes can be measured. In this case, without a 
transcript, no such record was available, and, 
therefore, no measurement of the District Court's 
actions can be made as urged upon us by the Defendant. 
And, as under elementary principles of Appellate 
review, we '. . . presume the findings of the Court to 
have been supported by admissible, competent, and 
substantial evidence. . .' we affirm. Id. at 608-609. 
The principle that without a transcript the Trial Court's 
actions are presumed valid was again reaffirmed by this Court in 
14 
Bagna^^v^^SuburMa^Land^Company, 579 P.2d 917 (Utah, 1978), and 
?£X£E«X-^£^j_^2Mi£H£ii2B^2[BE£BZj.«l2£^' 66S p-2d 442 (Utah, 
19 8 3) and finally, in Bennj.on y. LeGrandJohmson Construction 
Company, 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah, 1985). 
Counsel for Mr. Hatch had every opportunity at the November 
6, 1985 hearing to request the presence of a court reporter. 
Thus, this Court does not have the advantage of the transcript of 
those proceedings undertaken below. Therefore, the record on 
appeal is marginally helpful at best and leaves much to 
speculation and supposition. The cases cited above compel this 
Court to summarily dispose of Mr. Hatch's appeal and affirm the 
decision of the Trial Court and Domestic Commissioner below. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ITS INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Appellant has asked this Court to disregard the 
recommendation of the Domestics Commissioner and the decision of 
the Trial Court because he claims the issues of fairness and 
equity are not involved. That is simply not the case. 
Mrs. Hatch stated in her Verified Motion (R.57) that she 
requested her former counsel include in the Stipulation a 
provision that she, as the mother assuming custody of the 
parties' minor child and as the party assuming possession of the 
residence and the payment of the mortgage on the residence, would 
have the right to purchase Mr. Hatch's equity in an amount equal 
to one-half the equity existing at the time of the Decree 
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of Divorce. She would have that right upon the happening of the 
earliest of three contingencies. 
Appellant argues that he is entitled to one-half of the 
equity as of the date of the first occurrence of the listed 
contingencies. The Decree was entered in 1975, the first listing 
occurred in 1981. This would mean that Mrs. Hatch intended that 
after years of paying the mortgage payment, and after paying 
substantial sums improving and maintaining the home, she would 
automatically forfeit one-half of these amounts to her former 
husband. Certainly, the Stipulation as incorporated into the 
Decree of Divorce never contemplated such a result. Indeed, the 
last sentence of Paragraph 5 states that if neither party 
exercises the option to purchase, the home would be sold and the 
Defendant shall receive his equity which existed at the time of 
the Decree of Divorce. 
If the language contained in Paragraph 5 of the Decree of 
Divorce is ambiguous as to the amount of equity due Mr. Hatch, 
then the Trial Court has the discretion to interpret and clarify 
the terms of this Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce. (See 
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1258 (Utah, 1980)). The interpretation of 
Paragraph 5, as suggested by Mr. Hatch, is inherently unfair to 
Mrs. Hatch. Therefore, under general principles of equity 
attributable to divorce actions, the Trial Court was, in fact, 
required to exercise its discretion in interpreting that 
paragraph in a fair and equitable manner, which it did, even if a 
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Stipulation has been on file. (See DeBry^v^DeBry, 496 P.2d 92 
(Utah, 1972)), 
In so doing, it granted the relief sought by Mrs. Hatch in 
her Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute Quit Claim 
Deed and Request Clarification of Decree. Without resorting to a 
modification of the Decree of Divorce, the Trial Court used the 
wide discretion afforded it in divorce actions and entered an 
Order which correctly interpretated Paragraph 5 of the Decree in 
accord with the true intentions of the parties. Appellant has 
shown no abuse of discretion which, in any way, would justify a 
reversal or modification of the Trial CourtTs decision. 
APPELLANT'S ACTIONS IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
EFFECTIVELY BAR HIM FROM ASSERTING THE DEFENSE OF 
RES JUDICATA AGAINST THE RESPONDENT 
A. 
APPELLANT FAILED TO SUBMIT THE PROPOSED ORDER 
ON THE FIRST RECOMMENDATION OF THE DOMESTICS COMMISSIONER 
TO RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL AND IS, THEREFORE, 
BARRED FROM ASSERTING DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA 
Appellant asserts that the Order denying Respondent's Order 
to Show Cause signed by Judge Dee on October 9, 1985, is res 
judicata and prevents Respondent from requesting relief asked for 
in her Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute Quit Claim Deed and 
for Clarification of the Decree of Divorce. 
Counsel for Mrs. Hatch never received a copy of this Order and 
never knew that this Order had ever been presented to and signed 
by the Court. The mailing certificate clearlv states that the 
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copy of the Order was sent only to Gayla Hatch a/k/a Gayla Hatch 
Anderson at her residence. (A copy of this Order is included in 
the Addendum to this Brief and is marked Exhibit "E". 
The question before this Court is not whether Mrs. Hatch 
received a copy of this Order, but whether counsel for Mr. Hatch 
complied with Rule 2.9(b) of the RujLes^ _o^ _Pract_jLce_jLn_t_he 
5ili£l£i^2i-.2il£Hii«5£H£il-2l-_Uii^• Rule 2.9(b) requires, 
Copies of the proposed Judgment, Findings and/or Order 
must be served on opposing counsel before being 
presented to the court for signature, unless the Court 
otherwise orders. Notice of Objections thereto shall 
be submitted to the Court and Counsel within (5) days 
after service. 
In BigeJ_ow_v^__^ngerso^J. , 618 P.2d 50, (Utah, 1980), the 
Court established that a judgment does not exist unless the 
requirements of 2.9(b) have been met. In Bigelow, the Trial 
Court's judgment was signed without first being served on opposing 
counsel. In concluding that this judgment was not valid, this 
Court stated: 
. . .compliance with Rule 2.9(b) is necessary in order 
that a judgment be properly "filed", as that term is 
used in Rule 58A(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. 
at 52. 
The holding in Bj_g<e^ ow, £upra, was likewise followed in 
2£ll£_Xj._5j.^_§i£^££i-5£E£^£Z> 717 p-2d 697 <utah> 1986), 
. . .unless Rule 2.9(b) of the District and Circuit 
Court Rules of Practice has been complied with, the 
judgment in question is not deemed "filed" within the 
meaning or Rule 58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and a time for taking an appeal from that 
judgment under Rule 73(a). . .does not begin to run 
if a judgment has not been properly "entered". Id. at 
699. 
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A final judgment is necessary for the assertion of res; 
j^ ud^ catja as a bar to relitigation of an issue already tried and 
in this case the Order upon which Mr, Hatch relies was not 
"final" as that term has been interpreted by this Court, As was 
stated in K°°£_YjL_5°i*l, 602 P. 2d 1128, (Court of Appeals Oregon, 
1979): 
The rules of res* lH5*I£ata a r e n o t applicable with a 
judgment that Is not a TTnal judgment." Koos;, Id. at 
1130 (citing Restatements and Judgments, §41 (1942)). 
Mr. Hatch's assertion that the defense of res judicata would 
bar Mrs. Hatch's claim as determined by the Trial Court is simply 
without merit. 
B. 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY PLEAD AND 
APPLY THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW BAR ITS USE AS A DEFENSE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MARCH 6, 1986, JUDGMENT. 
At no time prior to the filing of this appeal did Mr. Hatch, 
by pleading or otherwise, raise the defense of resi j_u<Hcata. The 
limited record before the Court is clear on that point. 
Rule 8(c) of the U^ah^Ru^e^o^C^v^^Procedure provides that 
in pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively the defense of r£ss judicata. In surrounding 
jurisdictions, this policy has also been upheld. In Crocker_y^ 
Colorado Department of^Revenue , Mot^ or VehicleDivision, 6 5 2 P. 2d 
1068 (Colo., 1982), the Appellee, for the first time on appeal, 
asserted the doctrine of res iH^i£aia a s a bar o n further 
consideration of the proceedings. The Colorado Supreme Court 
stated that Rule 8 of the CoJ^orado^Ru^e^o^C^v^^Procedure, 
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which is similar to Rule 8 of the Ujt ah^RuJ^e^o^CJ^v^^ Procedure, 
provides that: 
?£^ lH^i££l- *s a n affirmative defense to a claim of 
an opposing party and must be set forth affirmatively 
in a responsive pleading by the party relying on the 
defense, . . failure to plead an affirmative defense as 
required by Rule 8(c) and failure to present any 
evidence or argument on the matter in district court, 
preclude us from reviewing the issue. Id. at 1071 
Thus, both the Ut ah Ruj^ es of C^ vj^ j. Procedure, and the 
general rule of the surrounding jurisdictions, preclude Mr. Hatch 
from asserting the defense of res; judicata when he failed to 
raise this in the proceedings below. Issues raised for the first 
time on appeal will not be considered by the reviewing court. 
Trayner_ v^_Cu s* hj_ng, 688 P.2d 754 (Utah, 1984); Combe_v^_Warren^s 
Zi[DiIy-5liX£zi!l£-L-l!l£_L> 6 8 0 p- 2 d 7 3 3 (Utah, 1984). 
POJ[NT_I_V 
APPELLANTS CLAIM THAT RESPONDENT HAS MADE 
A MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF DECREE OF DIVORCE IS 
INAPPLICABLE AND WITHOUT MERIT 
In Point III of his brief, Mr. Hatch is confused when he 
states that Mrs. Hatch requested the Trial Court to modify the 
original Decree. Mrs. Hatch never sought a modification of the 
original Decree. She simply requested that Mr. Hatch be 
compelled to accept payment of his equity and in return execute a 
Quit Claim Deed in her favor. She also requested the Trial Court 
clarify the rights of the parties under Paragraph 5 of the 
Decree. That was the request made at the September 30, 1985, 
hearing before the Domestics Commissioner and at the November 6, 
1985 hearing before Judge Dee. The arguments in Appellant!s 
20 
Brief related to this modification issue are simply inappropriate 
and misplaced, 
PO]NT_V 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HER 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS APPEAL 
No error has been shown to have been commited and Mr. 
Hatch*s appeal of the Trial courts' decision is without merit. 
When an appeal is shown to be without merit, the Respondent has 
the right to request this Court to award her attorney's fees 
associated with the appeal. As this Court properly concluded in 
Ca£i££__X^-Caii££» 5 8 4 p- 2 d 9 0 4 (Utah, 1978): 
However, the defendant argues that inasmuch as the 
plaintiff was unwilling to abide by the trial court's 
judgment, and that she has been put to the necessity of 
defending this appeal, the plaintiff should have to 
bear the costs thereof, including reasonable attorney?s 
fees for her counsel. We agree with the reasonableness 
and propriety of her requst. Id. at 906. 
See also Ehni^nge£_v^_Ehn_j_nger , 569 P. 2d 1104 (Utah, 1977). 
Fairness requires that Respondent not be required to deplete her 
limited assets in demonstrating that this appeal is without 
merit. She requests this Court to remand to the Trial Court for 
determination an award of her attorney1s fees and costs 
associated with this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hatch asks this Court to second guess the factual 
determination and decision of the Trial Court without the benefit 
of a transcript of the proceedings below. The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that unless a transcript is available, it will 
not consider disturbing the orders of a lower court. Mr. Hatch 
21 
never requested a court reporter. On this basis alone, the 
decision of the Trial Court should not be disturbed. 
The Trial Court acted with fairness and equity in its 
interpretation of Paragraph 5 of the Decree. The Appellant has 
shown no abuse of discretion by the Trial Court in its ruling as 
to rights and obligations of the parties under the Decree of 
Divorce. 
Appellant's failure to send Mrs. Hatch's counsel a copy of 
the proposed October 9, 1985 order violated the provisions of 
Rule 2.9 of the Local Rules of Practice. Consequently, no final 
Order was entered and without a final Order, the defense of res 
lH^i£^l£ *s *naPPlicable. 
The defense of res lH^I£^l£ w a s no* raised by Mr. Hatch 
until the filing of his Brief. As a result, Appellant Hatch and 
is prohibited from raising this issue for the first time on 
appeal. 
Any claims or defenses Appellant raises in his Brief in 
regard to the burden a moving party has in a modification of a 
Decree of Divorce are inapplicable. Mrs. Hatch requested the 
Trial Court to compel Mr. Hatch to accept payment of his lien 
on the marital residence. She also requested only a 
clarification of Paragraph 5 of the the Decree visT avis1 the 
Settlement Agreement, not a modification. 
The decision of the Domestics Commissioner and the Trial 
Court should be affirmed in all respects and Respondent should be 
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awarded her costs and attorneyTs fees related to this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j/_7_ day of November, 1986. 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, K£S3^NG & LIAPIS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing Brief of Respondent was hand delivered to: 
Gordon A. Madsen 
Robert C. Cummings 
Leland K. Wimmer 
320 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT "AT 
I* THX DISTRICT COJJLT OF TU£ TUIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT* W AXD FOR 
SALT UXX COUNTY, STATS Of UTAH 
CAYLA HATCH, 
Plalmtiff, 
HICHAXL HALL HATCH, 
Dafa&dant* 
S T I P U L A T I O N 
Civil Ho* 0.11595 
It i s hmraby •tlpttlatad and atraad by tad batvaan plaintiff and 
defandaat partoaally and tbalr raspactlva oogaul 4J follows i 
!• Da f and ant haraby conaaats tha* his dafault ba tatarad la chit 
action by tha court, and valvas hli ippaaranca la aaid action* Dtftndant 
furthar vaivaa tha mlaaty (^0) day waiting pariod and tha thraa (3) aouch 
int«riocutary pariod following tha groatlag of tha Dacraa ha rain. 
2* Plaintiff ahall tharaupon praaant avidanca to tha court In 
tup pert of tha al l igations of har Ccaaplaiat on f l la haxaio* If tha court 
daaau ouch arlianaa mf f i d ant to award to plaintiff a Dacraa of Divorco IX<M 
dafaadaat, than aaid Dacraa, aubjact to tha approval of tha court, ihall 
provida aa foilovit 
k* Plaintiff may ba avardad tha car a, cuatody and control of th« 
tvo nlaor ahlUrao of tha partlaa, to-witi J anas Craig Uatch and Vantita >u> 
Hatch, aubjact ta tha right of raaaoaabla vis i tat ions by tha dafaadant. 
b* Plaintiff say ba *ux4*d tha usa of tha bona and raal proparty 
l&catad at U227 tawth 2*60 Uast, l i w t o n , Utah, aubjact U tha paymaac ol 
th« nortgaga tharaom, tsntil tha ocotxrranca of ona of tha following contlngonc 
tcuviti tha raaarrtaga of plaintiff , tha jouagait child raae'vet majority* o: 
plaLntlff daslrat to aall aaid bona, at which tlma plaintiff ahall hav« 
f irst optic* to purchaaa dafandant's acuity pursuant to an appraisal to b« 
»•*!• forthwith to datamlna tha acuity aa of thla data, aaid appraisal to 
0Q00G6 
bo polo fox V7 ooftodoott mad dofoadont »holl hovo tho option to purchaso 
p i t l o t i f f f oojoity OQ tho ooouxronco of «ry of tho obovo cottdtt|<ncUi la 1 
ovoat pioiotiff doot not ouxxhAoo doftadoat'f oa^iity, ft^id Huity to bo b*j 
00 o* cpproiiol ond dotormiuotion 00 of tin doto of tho occurroaeo of on* c 
t h o ObOVC OMUlAJtCTULltt* I * t h o OVOQt O o l t h o r pOXtJ t X * t X l t f t h o OOtlon tC 
purtrha—«toid hoo* vould bo told cod defend ant von Id rocolvo tho tquicy 
purouoat to tho Docxoo of Diverco and tho pro n o t oyproiftoi* 
c# F U U t i f f aoy bo ovordod *o hox to l l ond soptroto proporcy tt 
furolturo, f*Tmiohifl*t omd flrt*rot, tbt 1970 Wick Rivioxo outonobilt tnd 
ptrooaol bo 10041*4 •• 
4* Dofoadoat moj bo ti irdoi o« hit 00U end otpffftU pxoooxty ck 
1964 Dodgo pickvp oad hit poxsoool boiominfi« 
o« Plt lat l f f iholi bo oxdoxod to u * m cod diochoxgt too oblig« 
ttoo dao Toxmoxi odniaifttxotioa o» tho moxtf 04* •* tho bono, «*d doiondont 
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tot forth b7 tho divcroo Coaoioiat, AO voi l *o 007 cad oil othor dobts ^ai 
obli^otiomo imourxtd by tho poxtiot during thoir morrloto oni hold plolatif 
hoxmioM thoxotroou 
f» Dofoadant iholl ho oxdorod to poy to p loin t i f f tho tun of 
U30.00 pox ahiU pox •oath, # totoi of $300*00 pox aoath, for tho oupport 
oad aolatoaoaco of tho two aiaox childroa of tho portios* 
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i« OoiooWont ski l l ho oxdoxod to poy $330*00 odditioool ottoraoy 
fooj to p U U t i f f ' t coomool hoxoia. 
OaTXD this d«y of , 1973. 
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DB2XD t. l ^ f f i t ; itio'xoor fox nofoadoal 
Utoh Sovlatt BldfM l o l t Loko Cityi Utoh 
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S T I P U L A T I O N 
Civil No. D- 13898 MICHAEL HALL HATCH, 
defendant. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Plaintiff and defendarthereby stipulate and agree together with thei 
respective at torneys, subject to the approval of the Court, as follows: 
1. Defendant hereby consents that his default be entered in this ac 
by the court, and waives his appearance in said action.and consent that 
plaintiff proceed to a hearing upon her complaint in accordance with the 
ing t e rms . j 
2. Plaintiff shall thereupon present evidence to the court in suppo 
the allegations of her complaint on file herein. If the court deems such 
evidence sufficient to award to plaintiff a Decree of Divorce from defend 
then said Decree, subject to the approval of the court, shall provide as 
follows: 
a. Plaintiff may be awarded the care , custody and control of the t 
minor children of the par t ies , to-wit: J ames Craig Hatch and Vanessa K 
Hatch, subject to the right of reasonable visitations by the defendant. 
b. Plaintiff may be awarded the use of the home and real property 
located at 13227 South 28C0 West, Riverton, Utah, subjea to the paymen 
the mortgage thereon, until the occurrence of one of the following contir 
gencies, to-wit: The r emar r i age of plaintiff, the youngest child reache: 
majority, or plaintiff des i res to sell said home, at which time defendanl 
shall have first option to purchase plaintiff's equity pursuant to an apprs 
to be made forthwith to determine the equity as of this date, said apprai 
to be paid for by defendant, and plaintiff shall have thcoption to purchas 
defendant's equity on the occurrence of any of the above contingencies ir 
G rOv^-
ij event defendant does not purchase plaintiff's equity, said equity to be based |j 
I; on an appraisa l and determination as of the date of the occurrence of one of 
it 
j'l the above contingencies. In the event neither party exerc ises the option to 
I 
i ! 
I1 purchase, said home would be sold and defendant would receive the equity 
i| 
il pursuant to the Decree o^ Divorce and the present appraisal . 
j! . c. Plaintiff may be awarded as her sole and separate property the 
i| furnityre, furnishings and fixtures, the 1970 Buick Riviera automobile and 
II her personal belongings. 
i d. Defendant may be awarded as his sole and separate property the 
ij 
jj 11368 Dodge pickup and his personal belongings and the personal property in-
!i 
his possession and control. I 
i| e. Plaintiff shall be ordered to assume and discharge the obligation 
l i 
;' Fa rm Home Administration on the mortgage on the home; and defendant sha 
ij 
li be ordered to assume and discharge all other debts and obligations as set jj 
jj forth by the divorce Complaint, as well as any and all other debts and oblij 
|i 
ji tions incurred prior to filing of this divorce, by the part ies during their 
! marr iage. 
li f. Defendant shall be ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of $100.00 f 
I child per month, for the support and maintenance of the two minor childre 
1 
jj of the par t ies . 
|j g. Defendant shall be ordered to maintain medical insurance on the 
i! 
i minor children and maintain his present life insurance naming the minor 
I 
:! children as beneficiaries thereon, through operation engineers so long as 
| i 
|j defendant is elegable to do so. 
ii h. Plaintiff shall be awarded no alimony. 
i 
! i. Plaintiff agrees to continue existing marr iage counseling. 
!j j . Each party shall assume and pay their own attourney fees and co 
i; COStS. 
j ! .. 
jl DATED tins C-&v clay of A^^j^rj^fajs 1975 
i 
GAYLA HATCH, Plaintiff 
<t 
NOLAN" J. OLSEN, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Sfr/z*/**' %«•> 
MICHAEL HALL HATCH, Defendant 
LELAND K. WIMMER, 
Attorney for Defendant 
Utah Savings Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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EXHIBIT. 
V , D " 
CUSTIN. ADAMS. KASTINC 6 LIAPIS 
A PROFf SSIONAL C O R P O R A T I O N 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
f . ^ N K J. CUSTIN
 r F L Q O R > N £ W Y O R K B U | L D | N C HARLEYW. CUSTIN 
JOHN S. ADAMS 1902-1977 
KENT M. KASTINC 48 POST OFFICE PLACE 
PAUL H. LIAPIS 
DEAN L. CRAY SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
WILLIAM A. STECALL, JR. TELEPHONE (801) 5 3 2 - 6 9 9 6 
DAVID W. OVERHOLT 
SHARON A. DONOVAN 
FRANK R. PICNANELLI 
September 13, 1985 
Leyland K. Wimmer, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
604 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Gayla Hatch Anderson v. Michael H. Hatch 
Dear Leyland: 
As you may have noted from the messages I have left at your 
office, Gayla Anderson has retained this office to represent her 
in the current controversy surrounding the divorce proceedings 
with your client. My initial discussion occurred about a week 
after the May 7, 1985 hearing in this matter. Subsequent to that 
meeting, I attempted on several occasions to contact Nolan Olsen, 
Gayla Anderson's previous counsel, as to what the current status 
of the case was. For some reason, Nolan Olsen refused to return 
any of my telephone calls and I was forced to search the court 
records for an answer. 
After waiting several weeks for the file to be returned to 
the archives, I discovered that the file was located either with 
Commissioner Peuler or with Commissioner Peulerfs clerk, Donna 
Baldwin. Eventually, Commissioner Peuler was able to track down 
the file and she, in turn, contacted me regarding such, since it 
was I who requested current information as to the status of the 
file. 
In that discussion with Commissioner Peuler, I expressed to 
her all that I really wanted at that point in time was an up-date 
on the status of the case so that I could then make my 
recommendations to my client. Commissioner Peuler suggested she 
be allowed time in which to make a decision as to what should be 
done in this matter. In that light, I received, as I am sure you 
did, her Memorandum Decision regarding Plaintiff's Motion for 
Order to Show Cause. 
I am concerned as to the type of representation Gayla Hatch 
Anderson was given by Mr. Olsen at the May 7, 1985 hearing. As 
you are aware, there is some controversy surrounding the final 
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wording of the Decree of Divorce, and there is some evidence 
pointing to the fact that my client may have already given your 
client the option on the house when it was listed several years 
ago. Because of these concerns, upon receipt of the Memorandum 
Decision, I contacted Commissioner Peuler and asked her whether 
it was proper to object to her decision or motion up another 
Order to Show Cause, based upon additional evidence. 
Commissioner Peuler suggested the latter route as the most 
effective. Therefore, I have scheduled an Order to Show Cause 
hearing for Monday, September 30th at 2:00 p.m. in front of 
Commissioner Peuler. I am currently in the process of collecting 
the necessary information to complete the affidavits and 
documents for this Order to Show Cause, and I will be sending 
them to your office shortly. 
If you have any problems or concerns with the items I have 
detailed above, please feel free to contact me. 
Very truly yours, 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
FRANK R. PIGNANELLI 
FRP/mla 
EXHIBIT. 
LELAND K . W I M4/L£fc* .&*•§ frp\ ~1 
Attorney for Defendant " " " - ^ ' ^ / 
604 Judge Building ' ^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 533-0538 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIALJDISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH 
OCT S i935 
GAYLA HATCH, 
plaintiff, 
- v s -
ORDER UPON HEARING OF 
PLAINTIFF'S ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
Civil No, 18898 
MICHAEL HALL HATCH, 
defendant. 
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Sandra Peuler, Commissioner on the 9th day of May A. D. 1985. 
Parties were present and represented by each of their respective attorneys 
of record. After arguments of counsel and review of the file the Court 
being fully advised in the matter now on motion of Leland K. Wimmer i t i s 
h e r e b y o r d e r e d that the relief requested by plaintiff's Order to Show 
Cause be denied. 
DATED this day oUfagust-A.D. 1985 
By t h e C o u r t , 
Recomme 
Sandra Peuler, Commissioner 
Mailing Certificate 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HiNT^vty 
Qy^^fc^^UAk 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct; copy'oFfKe'foreaotng-
Order Upon Hearing of Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause to Gayla Hatch a /k / a 
Gayla Hatch Anderson at 13227 South 2860 West , Rlverton, Utah 84065. 
EXHIBIT. V 
FILMED 
By FRANK R. PIGNANELLI (4392) GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
GAYLA HATCH ANDERSON, 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE. 
3al( 1.3k? Counts Utah 






MICHAEL HALL HATCH, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. D-18898 
Judge Dee 
ooOoo 
Defendant's Objection to Commissioner Sandra Peuler's 
September 30, 1985, Memorandum Decision in the above-entitled 
matter having come on regularly for hearing on November 6, 1985, 
at 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable David B. Dee, one of the 
Judges of the above-entitled Court, and Plaintiff appearing in 
person and by and through her counsel, and Defendant having 
appeared in person by and through his counsel, and the Court 
having heard argument from counsel, and the Court being further 
advised on the premises and upon the Motion of Frank R. 
Pignanelli of GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS, attorneys for 
Plaintiff; 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. That the intent of the Decree of Divorce entered by 
this Court on November 21, 1975, as evidenced by the Stipulation, 
is that the Defendant is to receive the one-half share of his 
equity based upon the amount of equity existing at the time of 
the Decree, 
2. That the Defendant is to receive his share of the 
equity in the parties marital residence at such time as the 
Plaintiff exercises the option to purchase Defendant's share of 
the equity, or upon the occurrence of one of the contingencies 
listed in Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce. 
3. That if Defendant purchases Plaintiff's share of equity 
in the parties marital residence, Plaintiff's equity is to be 
determined as of the date of the occurrence of the listed 
contingency in paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce. 
4. That the Recommendations contained in Commissioner 
Peuler's September 30, 1985, Memorandum Decision in the 
above-entitled matter are affirmed, 
DATED this j ^ day of ^biud!T}, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
B. D E E ^ 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge^
 (-
H. DiXON nnjiOLEY 
\} [Vr,.,t*/ Clerk 
